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The Left and Humanitarian Intervention as Solidarity
Harry van der Linden
Bernard Kouchner, founder of the humanitarian aid organization Physicians without Borders,
stated some time prior to the NATO intervention in Kosova that “in a world aflame after the
Cold War we need to establish a forward-looking right of the world community to actively
interfere in the affairs of sovereign nations to prevent an explosion of human rights
violations.”1 On his account, it is not enough that humanitarian organizations such as
Physicians without Borders or the Red Cross are provided access, by military force if needed, to
victims of systematic human rights deprivations; rather, “it is necessary to take the further step
of using the right to intervention as a preventive measure to stop wars before they start and to
stop murderers before they kill.”2 Kouchner adds that humanitarian interventions must be
executed by an “impartial multinational force acting under the authority of international
organizations and controlled by them.” More specifically, he maintains that a more democratic
United Nations should have the capacity to authorize such interventions.3
European and North American political commentators and government officials across the
political spectrum echoed Kouchner’s view in their justification of the NATO intervention in
Kosova. For most of them, including Kouchner himself, it was not a matter of great concern
that it was the USA and other NATO countries that undertook the intervention. Noam Chomsky
coined the phrase “new military humanism” to capture this outpouring of support for
intervention aimed at protecting human rights. He described it as a mere sham, covering up
the real issue that “Serbia is one of those disorderly miscreants that impede the institution of
the U.S. dominated global system.”4 More broadly, Chomsky holds that the lesson of the
Kosova intervention is that the USA and its Western allies have developed during the past
decade a new hegemonic strategy and ideology: interventionism couched in humanitarian
terms.
In my view, Chomsky offers a too simple analysis of the political situation in the Balkans, but
this is not my concern here. My aim also is not to discuss whether the NATO intervention was
all-in-all justified, nor to debate the contested scope of human rights violations in Kosova.
Rather, I wish to examine in their generalized form the arguments used by Chomsky and many
on the left against the NATO intervention.5 These arguments amount to an almost unqualified
rejection of all humanitarian intervention, and involve a failure to recognize the growing impact
of human rights discourse on international relations and politics. I will maintain that even
though the left should oppose the USA or NATO playing dominant roles in intervening forces, it
should not reject outright a human rights liberalism, as defended by Kouchner and others,
which calls for military rescue in humanitarian emergencies. Rather, the left should bring this
liberalism to a higher plane, as a politics of active solidarity with the oppressed and victims of
human rights violations everywhere.6 This politics of solidarity should include acceptance of
humanitarian intervention as a last-resort measure, and, above all, should seek to change the
international institutional arrangements that contribute to human rights deprivations as we
continue to struggle for a just global order.

Chomsky is correct in noting that one of the striking features of the intervention in Kosova was
a widespread appeal to moral norms and values, with the basic tenet that the world
community, approaching the new millennium, should no longer tolerate ethnic cleansing or
other systematic human rights deprivations. Other motives were given, such as saving NATO’s
credibility and safeguarding regional security, but the moral argument was often emphasized.
On Chomsky’s account, this moral appeal on the side of NATO politicians, diplomats, and
military was a cover-up for “something more crass and familiar,” that is, the interest of the USA
and other dominant Western states to sustain and even broaden their political, cultural, and
economic global hegemony.7 Chomsky holds that the people in power deliberately and
disingenuously used a humanistic discourse to win popular support for the NATO intervention
and that what is especially disconcerting about the Kosova case is that even some progressive
intellectuals and activists fell for this trap.8 His recommendation is that those who oppose
American hegemony should reject all use of military force except for self-defense or when
authorized by the UN Security Council, making humanitarian intervention legitimate in very few
circumstances, and seldom to never a practical option.9
Chomsky then maintains that the realist view of international relations offers the most accurate
description of international politics because it states that security, national interests, and power
basically determine the conduct of nations and the rules of international society. In contrast,
many defenders of the NATO intervention adhered to, or at least came closer to accepting,
what may be called “cosmopolitan human rights liberalism.” Descriptively, this position holds
that international society, especially since the Cold War, is moving in the direction of
articulating and accepting the norm that it must prevent gross human rights abuses
everywhere, setting aside the statist norm that human rights are primarily a matter of domestic
jurisdiction. Prescriptively, the position argues that a society of states must adopt the norm of
humanitarian intervention because the concerns of justice do not stop at national borders. All
human beings must be guaranteed some fundamental rights, irrespective of their political or
national membership.
Chomsky offers two basic arguments in support of his contention that a false humanism guides
recent interventions. First, he argues, “it is close to a universal truth that the use of force is
driven by humanitarian commitments,” and that, to put it dryly, “the world beyond looks a bit
different.”10 In other words, states have always used humanitarian justifications for wars of
conquest and dominance. The USA and its Western allies adopted a humanitarian rhetoric in
the 1990s to replace the rhetoric of the Cold War, and such use of moral rhetoric is as old as the
history of the unjust employment of violent force. Chomsky writes: “If we had records we might
find that Genghis Khan and Attila the Hun professed humanitarian motives.” Turning to the
Western nations and their imperialist record, he concludes that “‘the new interventionism’ is
simply ‘the old interventionism’,” and that, in general, upon unbiased investigation, “the
category of genuine humanitarian intervention might turn out to be literally null.”11
Chomsky’s second argument is that to ascribe genuine humanism to the West is inconsistent
with the fact that the West has neglected or failed to respond actively or in timely manner to

such gross human rights abuses as, for example, in Turkey (against the Kurds) or in East Timor.
Its humanism appears arbitrarily selective until one grasps that considerations of economic and
political hegemony actually determine where interventions take place. These same
considerations explain how it can be that the military humanists and their governments are
directly responsible for human rights violations, such as in Colombia.12
Chomsky’s first argument is the weaker of the two. It is true that the use of moral language to
defend the employment of military force has a long history, but there is a fundamental
difference between a humanism that warrants force for “civilizing” purposes, as was typical in
“the old interventionism,” and a humanism that supports force that aims at preventing
(further) flagrant and massive human rights abuses in accordance with the will of the rescued.
Moreover, what sets humanitarian intervention further apart from the old interventionism is
that it must not seek territorial gain or impose a preferred political regime against the will of
the people. What is most striking and implausible about Chomsky’s argument is that it implies
that the evolving human rights discourse and international humanitarian law of the past fifty
years have not really influenced the conduct of the dominant Western states. Thus we would
have to conclude that the numerous debates in the UN on the appropriateness of humanitarian
intervention were in fact merely smokescreens. We would also have to draw the inference that
those countries of the South that, for example, approved of humanitarian intervention in
Somalia, were merely fooled or pressured to vote in accordance with non-humanitarian
Western interests. Yet Chomsky never explains what these interests might have been.13
Further, even if one grants that Western states came to humanitarian justifications out of
ulterior motives, Chomsky’s descriptive realism still needs to be modified to include
consideration for how humanitarian justifications set precedents, and thus place constraints on
the justifiable scope of future actions.14
Chomsky’s second charge, of Western selectivity in humanitarian operations, is not new. It was
commonly and vehemently argued in light of Western inaction with regard to the genocide in
Rwanda in 1994. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan also raised the issue in his address to the
1999 opening meeting of the General Assembly: “If the new commitment to intervention in the
face of extreme suffering is to retain the support of the world’s peoples, it must be—and must
be seen to be—fairly and consistently applied, irrespective of region or nation. Humanity, after
all, is indivisible.”15 Annan’s comment anticipates Chomsky’s charge of inconsistency, while
illustrating the point made above, that stated justifications have ramifications for future
actions, irrespective of whether they were sincerely made. As Annan argues, Western neglect
of humanitarian crises in the post-Kosova era will be a bit harder to defend.
At any rate, the charge of selectivity does not conclusively establish the claim of false
humanism. What appears as selectivity might actually be rooted in good reasons, such as
different chances for success in different humanitarian crises, or different anticipated costs to
the intervening forces. More importantly, selectivity seems partly to be the result of the
international community not yet having arrived at consensus concerning the standards of
justified intervention. It is also not to be expected that consistency in humanitarian responses
will be forthcoming until the international community has some military force under its

authority that can readily be dispatched to humanitarian disaster areas. Even then, it might be
hard to escape the charge of selectivity, in light of the great number of humanitarian
emergencies that confront our world, and the numerous different factors that would come into
play in making the necessary decisions where intervention would take place, or where not.16 A
final consideration is that the media are not consistent in their coverage of systematic human
rights violations, and thus contribute to creating selective public and even governmental
responses that are not necessarily dishonest. All this is not to say that Chomsky’s claim of false
humanism has no merit. We definitely should question, for example, the consistency of claims
made by former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, who said on the one hand that “you
cannot in 1999 have this kind of barbaric ethnic cleansing [in Kosova]” and “democracies [must]
stand up against this evil”; while, on the other hand, she defended the continuation of the prewar economic sanctions against Iraq, imposed primarily by these same democracies. It was
Albright who told an interviewer that the Iraq sanctions may have caused the deaths of half a
million Iraqi children, but that “we think that the price is worth it.”16 Chomsky’s indignation is
often well-taken and he is skilled at unmasking Western moral hypocrisy, but he pushes his
thesis of “humanism as ideology” too far.
In his 1999 annual address to the General Assembly, Annan challenged the international
community to articulate standards of justified intervention. In response to those who reject all
force that is not authorized by the Security Council, he raised the question: “If, in those dark
days and hours leading up to the genocide [in Rwanda], a coalition of states had been prepared
to act in defense of the Tutsi population, but did not receive prompt Council authorization,
should such a coalition have stood aside and allowed the horror to unfold?” In response to
those who saw the Kosova intervention as a great step forward because this intervention left
behind the confines of Council approval, Annan posed the question of whether the intervention
did not set “dangerous precedents for future interventions without a clear criterion to decide
who might invoke these precedents, and in what circumstances?” These are good questions
and the left should contribute to answering them. Following the logic of Chomsky’s view,
however, the left will remain on the sideline, indignant and appalled by the unfolding drama of
“false humanism.”
Motives that guide a humanitarian intervention cannot settle as such whether an intervention
is justified. Genuine humanitarian motives obviously do not suffice to justify an intervention,
but the reverse is also true. Non-humanitarian reasons, as complementary or even sole motives
for an intervention, do not suffice to show that it was unjustified. What matters crucially in
assessing a humanitarian intervention is that the stated purpose—prevention of gross human
rights violations— is consistently pursued and kept in view, and that no means are employed
that undermine this pursuit. Motives are only essential for determining whether the
intervening forces deserve moral praise. Even though humanitarian motives will typically
contribute to making humanitarian intervention successful, the planned outcome of
intervention should be the defining criterion of humanitarian intervention, not that the motives
behind it are primarily humanitarian.18

In shifting the focus of evaluation from motive to outcome or purpose, the burden of proof also
shifts to those who unconditionally oppose intervention. The purpose of humanitarian
intervention may be viewed as that of a rescue operation, where the people in need of rescue
live in a state that no longer protects them against systematic human rights violations, or where
the state itself has become the perpetrator of these violations. An outside agent is thus needed
to bring protection. Michael Walzer likens the situation to that of people inside a burning
building, desperately in need of firefighters. The analogy is far from perfect, in that burning
buildings typically result from accidents, but Walzer perceptively adds that it is “important for
the future of the left ... that our people, our activists and supporters around the world, see the
fires for what they are: deliberately set, the work of arsonists, aimed to kill, terribly dangerous.”
He continues: “Of course, every fire has a complicated social, political, and economic
background.” And one may wish to add (with Chomsky) that once this background is explored,
we will find that all too often the very same Western nations that embrace the language of
rights bear some or even a main responsibility for the emerging humanitarian disaster. Still,
and here Walzer speaks again, “once the burning [of buildings] begins something less than full
understanding is necessary: a will to put out the fire—to find firefighters.” He concludes, “I
can’t just sit and watch. Or rather, the price of sitting and watching is a kind of moral corruption
that leftists (and others too) must always resist.”19
Walzer’s comments here support the notion that intended outcome, rather than motive, is the
defining test of humanitarian intervention. After all, what defines firefighters is the tasks that
they perform, not their motives for performing them, and what matters most to those in need
of firefighters is that they are rescued, irrespective of the exact motives of their rescuers.
Walzer’s comments also rightly emphasize that once a humanitarian horror unfolds, the main
moral concern should be to try to stop it. We may not be able to get UN authorization, say, for
the employment of our firefighters, but how could this be decisive? Annan suggests the same.
Philip Gourevitch wrote in a report on the génocidaires in Rwanda: “All across Rwanda: murder,
murder, murder, murder, murder, murder, murder, murder, murder ... eight hundred thousand
killed in a hundred days. That’s ... five and a half lives terminated every minute.”20 Now
supposing (with Annan) that some regional force would have been prepared and able to stop
this horror, what normative objections would be so weighty as to nonetheless warrant inaction
if the Security Council would fail to authorize it?21
The situation in Kosova was a far cry from what happened in Rwanda, but the issue is that many
on the left who condemned the NATO intervention were not really willing to entertain the
argument that humanitarian intervention may be justified without UN (Security Council)
authorization. One common position asserted that intervention without such authorization
breaches international law. It was also frequently stressed that the Kosova intervention violated
Serbia’s sovereignty. I will examine these arguments in turn (in their generalized form) prior to
considering them as part of a broader and more weighty concern: that approval of
humanitarian intervention in the post-Cold War world invites escalation of unjust employment
of force, especially by dominant Western states.

The legal status of humanitarian intervention is far from clear cut. Article 2.7 of the UN Charter
prohibits the UN itself from intervening “in matters which are essentially within the jurisdiction
of any state.” The Security Council may only authorize force when there is a continuous threat
to the maintenance of “international peace and security” (Articles 33, 39, and 42). On a strict
reading (one that Chomsky seems to recommend in practice), humanitarian intervention is
legitimate only if human rights violations in one country pose a security threat to others. On a
much broader reading, all massive human rights violations are matters of international peace
and security. Perhaps, the Security Council moved toward this latter reading in its approval of
humanitarian intervention in Somalia, but some nations, such as China, argued that they
supported the action only because Somalia had ceased to be a sovereign state, and so Article
2.7 was not violated. In the case of Kosova, the Security Council adopted a resolution that
Serbian conduct posed a threat to international peace and security, but it did not subsequently
authorize force to meet the threat. Neither did the Security Council respond to the
humanitarian crisis in East Timor in September 1999.22 Considering both the wording of terms
for when the Security Council may authorize force and the veto power of its permanent
members, it is to be expected that the Security Council at times will continue to fail to
effectively address cases in desperate need of intervention, leaving only the option of unilateral
humanitarian intervention undertaken by one or more nations.23
Article 2.4 seems to prohibit unilateral interventions, demanding that all member states “shall
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
Purposes of the United Nations.” In response, it should first of all be noted that humanitarian
intervention is not inconsistent with the purposes of the UN; rather, it fits with its aim of
“promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms” (article
1.3).24 The UN Declaration of Human Rights and other UN human rights treaties confirm this
purpose. Article I of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide commits all its contracting parties to view genocide as “a crime under international
law that they undertake to prevent and to punish.” In some circumstances, it seems that
forcible intervention is the only way left to fulfill this obligation.
In this context, it is significant to note that the Clinton administration initially forbade the use of
the term ‘genocide’ in reference to the unfolding horror in Rwanda, recognizing that its inaction
was hard to reconcile with the 1948 Convention (that the USA shamefully refused to ratify until
1989).25 Another reply to the alleged intervention prohibition of Article 2.4 is that intervention
does not fall under this article because intervention does not aim at permanently undermining
territorial integrity or political independence. A final response is that the UN Charter does not
override the customary international law of humanitarian intervention. This argument can be
buttressed by the claim that since the Security Council has not succeeded in operating in
accordance with the humanitarian purposes of the UN, customary law in the area of preventing
massive human rights violations remains binding. 26
It is not the place here to try to settle the legal side of humanitarian intervention, but it should
be clear that the legal question is sufficiently open and in flux to allow the left to contribute to

its progressive explication. The Security Council has become somewhat more susceptible to the
idea that gross human rights violations are not only matters of domestic jurisdiction; and this
development should be further encouraged in combination with seeking a more democratic,
and representative, operation and composition of the Security Council. In the meantime, the
case should be made that there are good moral and legal reasons for claiming that unilateral
intervention, under some conditions, should be viewed as legally legitimate by the international
community—for example, when the Security Council (or the General Assembly) does not deny
the occurrence of a humanitarian emergency, but fails to authorize preventive action. The left
should seek to articulate such conditions, and promote their significance within the
international community. To insist on maintaining the present legal international order, while
adopting a restrictive reading of the UN Charter, would be incompatible with humanitarian and
cosmopolitan commitments of both the left and the Charter.27 In effect, it would mean siding
with the political conservative’s preference for order at the cost of justice, and would leave
countless people with no ultimate protectionagainst gross human rights violations.
The claim that humanitarian intervention is legally or morally wrong because it violates state
sovereignty may be refuted on similar grounds. What warrants the treatment of the state as a
sovereign entity is that the state at least approximates the just state as an expression of the will
of the people. In other words, what deserves moral recognition is not the state as mere legal
order or instrument of power, but as the collective self-determination of the people.
Humanitarian emergencies typically involve struggles for self-determination that have been
suppressed by states. Here, even the very minimal condition of self-determination, i.e., the
protection of human life itself, is no longer provided by the state for many citizens, and so the
state loses its legitimacy and normative claim to sovereignty. To value sovereignty as such is to
value a shield behind which terror is allowed to triumph. Again, states have signed away
unconditional sovereignty by signing numerous international documents, treaties, and UN
covenants in support of human rights. The same is true of environmental agreements,
underlining the point that sovereignty is conditional on a state’s responsibility toward both
citizens and natural resources.28
Insistence on absolute state sovereignty, within a strict reading of international law, may be
viewed sympathetically as a practical safeguard against dangers of escalation, rather than as a
principle to be argued for its own sake. The concern is that widespread approval of
humanitarian intervention will further normalize the use of military force in international
affairs, adding to the dominance of powerful states, and destabilizing the international order.
Overall, Chomsky’s argument against the new military humanism is to be interpreted along
these lines. It is an argument for justice, with the aim of protecting especially the countries of
the South and the human rights of their citizens against the hegemony of the North. But the
safeguard argument is based on a debatable empirical premise. Even if one grants that
legitimation of humanitarian intervention carries risk of escalation and hegemony, it still needs
to be decided whether preventing humanitarian emergencies would still be worth that risk. To
argue that avoiding the risk of hegemonic escalation is all that matters would lend credence to
a recent critic who dismisses “the utopian nihilism of a left that would prefer to see genocide in
Bosnia and the mass deportation of the Kosovars rather than strengthen, however marginally,

the hegemony of the United States.”29 To make anti-USA, anti-Western, or anti-North
hegemony one’s exclusive normative orientation may create a moral blind spot. It seems to
have led some radical critics of the NATO intervention in Kosova to understate or even neglect
the crimes of Serbia, and not to express any support for, or empathy with, the struggle of the
Albanian Kosovars.30
In practice, there are several ways of addressing the danger of (hegemonic) escalation. A more
representative and democratic Security Council would help to alleviate the worry in the South
concerning “humanitarian imperialism.” This worry is certainly not without justification, but the
left should avoid the mistake of taking it simply at its face value. China’s persistent objection to
humanitarian intervention, for example, should be judged in light of its Tibet policy. In cases of
unilateral intervention, the risk of making international relations more violent and insecure can
be reduced by the preconditions that Security Council authorization should be sought first, and
that the intervention should occur only if a veto or vote clearly deviates from the overall
opinion of the international community. With regard to both UN authorized and unilateral
interventions, this same risk will be minimized as long as interventions are guided by their
purpose, have no territorial or political ambitions, and accord with the will of the rescued.
Of course, forcible intervention should always be a last resort, executed only when nonviolent
interventions or mediations are no longer able to prevent massive human rights violations. It
also seems helpful in cases of unilateral interventions that the intervening force should be truly
multinational and obligated to give a full account of its action to the Security Council.31 A final
anti-hegemonic measure would push for an agenda in the West that seeks rescue from all
causes of human suffering, not just political terror, but also economic exploitation or neglect.
This measure will be my concern below. In sum, all the measures together may not fully put to
rest the worry of escalation or hegemony, but it must not be forgotten that the alternative, of
unconditional opposition to humanitarian intervention, may leave oppressed people with no
real defense against mass murder.
Since humanitarian intervention involves the employment of military force, we may apply, and
have actually already applied, just war principles. These principles consist of criteria for when
war is justly initiated (jus ad bellum) and how war should be conducted (jus in bello). We
should proceed with caution in applying the principles though, in that intervention involves
three actors (rather than two in traditional war): the intervening force, the people requesting
rescue, and the human rights violators.32 Two applicable criteria for just initiation have not yet
been discussed: reasonable chance of success, and proportionality. The first implies that
intervention must expect to succeed in preventing massive human rights violations, both
immediately and in the long term. So the intervening force must be prepared to take on postrescue obligations in this regard. The second principle, that the good pursued by military force
should be proportionate to the evil that it causes, implies that human rights violations should
be severe and widespread enough to warrant the inevitable human costs of war. For
humanitarian intervention, the most important principle for just conduct is noncombatant
immunity, prohibiting the direct targeting of civilians, use of indiscriminate weapons, and the

indiscriminate use of weapons. This principle extends to civilians who are neither engaged in
violent aggression nor part of the rescued.
It is debatable whether the Kosova situation met the principle of proportionality. Perhaps the
intervention did not violate in its very beginning the principle of reasonable chance of success,
but it soon became clear that the policy of not employing ground troops, and only using highaltitude bombing against military targets, helped to trigger a massive refugee problem, and had
a dim prospect of success. Only the subsequent escalation of the bombing and the destruction
of Serbian infrastructure (bridges, refineries, fuel depots, industries, media, and government
buildings) led eventually to some success, but also involved violations of noncombatant
immunity. The rationale, for example, that industries with both military and civilian purposes
may be bombed, makes a mockery out of the just-conduct principle. The NATO command
neglected the principle that firefighters, as rescuers, should save buildings, not bomb them, nor
flatten surrounding neighborhoods.
Here, another objection raised by some on the left comes into the picture. Are not all military
humanitarian interventions necessarily unjust in their execution due to the nature of modern
warfare? There are two ways of reading this objection. Modern warfare inevitably inflicts
injustices on some people, and modern warfare overall cannot be justly executed.33 The
former claim is correct—it is unjust to noncombatants that they become victims of war—and it
makes anti-war pacifism (as distinct from a pacifism that rejects all lethal violence) morally
attractive and even imperative, were it not for the fact that anti-war pacifism leaves people
subjected to systematic violence and terror without any effective outside assistance
as a last resort measure. The second claim leads to the question of who should intervene in our
present world.
Consider how Samuel Berger, Clinton’s National Security Advisor at the time of the NATO
bombing, justified the NATO intervention in Kosova. “We demonstrated there is a line beyond
which we will not tolerate the kind of brutality we saw. ... Where there is genocide or ethnic
cleansing, where we have the capacity to act as we did in Kosovo with NATO, where we have a
national interest, I believe we should act.” Then, in apparent response to the challenge that
USA humanitarian concerns seem rather selective and partial, Berger said: “We certainly
couldn’t have acted in Rwanda militarily. It is difficult to stop people going after each other
with machetes with an F-16.”34 Berger’s last comment does not show that humanitarian
interventions should be rejected as inevitably violating noncombatant immunity, but rather
that, irrespective of hegemonic concerns, the USA military is generally not suitable to be the
main, and certainly not the sole, intervening agent, because of its focus on indiscriminately
using high technology weapons that tend to be indiscriminate in the first place.
The indiscriminate, high-tech focus of the military seems motivated by commercial interests as
well as by the political estimate that the people of the USA will not tolerate their own
casualties, not when caused by wars, nor especially by humanitarian interventions. Thus, the
military will opt for high-altitude bombing rather than for more discriminate, but also more
risky, low-altitude bombing. Meanwhile, ground troops, when used at all, will usually be sent

into environments that have been subjected to massive destruction. In a way, the attitude of
the people in the USA in demanding minimal casualties among their troops is defensible,
because too often in the past the lives of soldiers have been sacrificed for dubious and immoral
purposes. However, what is morally unacceptable is that reducing the risk of USA casualties
through the massive use of high-tech weapons is bought at the cost of lives among countless
enemy civilians, and these victims remain morally invisible to the public eye. They also remain
invisible to the soldiers themselves. War turns into a technological job. This trend is particularly
worrisome in light of the technological military capabilities that lie ahead. Thus, citizens of the
USA may come to embrace war from space (the employment of laser weapons) as a “clean”
way for their soldiers to engage in humanitarian rescues. This will strengthen USA hegemony
and likely increase violations of noncombatant immunity.35
A solution would be the creation of special humanitarian rescue forces under authority of the
UN. These troops would consist of volunteers from all nations, and would be trained to use
force appropriate to the task, employing modern weapons only in discriminate fashion.36 Even
Berger admits that interventions need not be primarily high-tech in nature. In the interview
cited above, he calls for the formation of small military units in Africa for the sake of dealing
with its humanitarian crises. Employment of UN forces would reduce the hegemony problem.
This has two other advantages as compared to using national armies. First, it addresses a
certain injustice embedded in demanding soldiers in national armies to engage in rescue
operations. Soldiers are not fully trained to engage in rescue operations, and we may assume
that most of them have joined with an understanding that they should defend compatriots and,
more dubiously, promote the national interest, not save foreign people at great risk to
themselves.
Second, the formation of UN rescue forces seems a good solution to the problem of whether
humanitarian intervention is a duty. All nations have committed themselves to the task of the
universal realization of human rights. This task includes prevention of humanitarian disasters.
On any reasonable account of the duty of rescue, there are definite limits to the risks that we
must take to save strangers, except when we adopt special obligations, such as those adopted
by firefighters, for example. Mere passersby have only a duty of easy rescue. For national
soldiers, the duty to rescue would be less strong than for firefighters. Moreover, national
armies meet coordination problems, and uneven rescue burdens may be placed on some
national armies. So the best way for both individuals and states to discharge the duty of
preventing massive human rights violations is to create a voluntary force of global firefighters.
Walzer objects to a UN rescue force, because the “oligarchic structure” of the Security Council
would block many interventions. He adds that “the men and women in the burning building are
probably better served if they can appeal to more than a single set of firefighters.”37 In
response to Walzer, it should be noted that the more democratic the UN becomes, the less
there is a need for unilateral intervention. In the meantime, it seems best that if unilateral
rescue is necessary, the composition of the force should be multinational. This might be
difficult on logistic grounds, but is important for the sake of reducing hegemonic fears, and
avoiding the danger that ulterior interests will guide the intervention. It is also a matter of fairly

sharing the burden of casualties and costs among nations, and strengthening the notion that
the prevention of massive human rights violations is the task of all nations.
Critics of a UN rescue force see two further problems. More than one global fire brigade might
be needed to deal with several humanitarian disasters at the same time, and such forces are
not equipped to perform long-term, post-rescue obligations.38 It is true that several global
rescue forces may be needed, but one may hope that nations will be prepared to bear the costs
because of growing interdependence, fewer inter-state conflicts, and more intra-state crises.
The other objection, that intervening military forces lack post-rescue capabilities, is not really
an objection to the desirability of global rescue forces as such, but rather suggests that a
commitment to humanitarian intervention should be part of a broader commitment to create a
just global order.39 Typically, humanitarian emergencies result from many years of oppressive
politics and failure to address severe economic inequality and exploitation. To be sure, ethnic
hatred as a recent common motive in gross human rights violations is not simply caused by
poor political and economic conditions, but it is only under such conditions that it is likely to
lead to such violations. Accordingly, long-term success may require that rescue operations be
followed by years of mediation, military policing, and economic and political assistance. In light
of this, it is not surprising that some liberal thinkers have begun to reassess their support for
humanitarian intervention. USA public support for long-term post-rescue work also seems
weak, especially if it involves casualties (as in Somalia).
Here lies a task for the left—to transform a liberal politics of limited rescue into a politics of
solidarity. We must show that people in the USA (and other wealthy nations) profit from, and
participate in, global institutional arrangements that promote many human rights violations
through sustaining oppressive and exploitative regimes.40 There is no need to deny that public
empathy for humanitarian disasters is often genuine, but it is also selective in failing to see its
own universal responsibility. Post-rescue obligations are not only a matter of moral kindness,
nor merely implied by a general commitment of all nations to uphold human rights, but they
are also demanded by justice. This is especially so when the West is a direct cause of human
rights violations. The West may need to pay most of the costs of post-rescue, but the task,
especially in its nonmilitary dimensions, should be placed in the hands of a strengthened UN,
drawing upon resources from Non-Governmental Organizations and the like. The reasons that
make a UN rescue force preferable to national intervening forces are also reasons for putting
the UN at the center of post-rescue efforts.
Public empathy is also too narrow in its focus, neglecting daily injustices, harms, and deaths.
The public in the West is shocked by ethnic cleansing and murder, but neglects to see how our
global economic order systematically favors the rich and neglects the poor in such a way that
short life expectancy, maternal death, infant death, and stunted physical and mental
development of children have become routine. A similar mistake is made by many
cosmopolitan human rights liberals who, as they pursue civil and political rights, neglect
economic rights and their significance for survival and basic human flourishing. Further, the
public responds with disgust to “the killing fields,” but accepts slow and premature deaths
caused by economic sanctions. A politics of solidarity, to the contrary, involves the principled

stance of seeking to eliminate human suffering and human rights violations everywhere and in
all forms, going beyond just feeling empathy when images of refugees and terror against
humans flash across the screen or appear in the daily paper. The stance of solidarity includes,
but also goes beyond, rescue that most citizens in the West can perform by shifting some of
their resources to the global poor and oppressed. It is committed to preventing the need for
humanitarian intervention by engaging in the arduous task of seeking global justice.
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